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Abstract 
Banks and other financial institutions have increasingly realized the necessity to measure and manage the credit risk of their 
loans. Credit derivatives CDs, therefore, have arisen in response to the surging demand of financial institutions to design vehicle 
tools for hedging and transferring credit risks. Credit Default Swaps CDS are valuable financial tools that have created system-
wide benefits. However, at the same time these innovation contracts have likewise created the prospect for market participants to 
destabilize the whole economic system. Over the last years, international financial markets have suffered disastrous disruptions 
caused by various factors. The most important of these factors, in particular, is the detrimental impact of CDs as hedge funds on 
different markets of different sizes and structures. They have been blamed for part of the difficulties associated with the subprime 
credit crisis. As though, these credit risk transfer products require a basis for sound applications and uses. This study aims to 
elucidate on the problems associated with market participants in particular the large financial institutions that were eminently 
involved the recent financial crisis. Furthermore this paper presents a discussion of the blaming of hedge funds for financial crisis 
by focusing on the American International Group which blundering in the CDS market and causing system-wide instability, and 
argue the company’s high efficient risk management and profuse diversity financial tools, which insure financial institutions, 
could prevent sorts of financial risks. As a result of AIG’s exposure analysis in CDS positions, we find CDS were key contributor 
on igniting and exacerbation of current financial crisis.
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1. Introduction 
In general, CDs are remarkably versatile and adjustable instruments, allowing counterparties to efficiently manage 
their credit risk exposure and their value is derived from underlying credit instruments. CDs are essentially designed 
to reduce or eliminate credit risk by offering insurance contracts against losses experienced due to the credit events 
as well as to acquire specified level of credit exposure to enhance the profits of market’s participants. 
Among various CDs tools, a credit default swap is the most important type of CDs, bilateral over-the-counter OTC 
contract whose purpose is to shift credit exposure to a credit protection seller. A protection buyer pays periodic cash 
flows as a premium to the protection seller in exchange for payment if a credit event occurs. 
While CDs play an effective role by reallocating risk and allow superior alignment between maturities of diversified 
credit exposures, they can also create problems in the financial system by minimizing incentives to monitor the 
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borrowers, create moral hazard problem and asymmetric information risks that have been pictured as one of the 
main culprits of the recent financial crisis.  
These credit transfer vehicles have had a considerable effect on financial markets, both in easing the trading of 
credit risk and increasing the complexity of financial transactions. This paper proceeds as follows, firstly, we 
provide an overview of CDs, problem statement and research objectives. Secondly, we highlight market challenges 
of CDs and their role in the 2007 financial crisis. Thirdly, we shed light on some aspects of the American 
International Group AIG including its Background, AIG Bankruptcy, Share Price and an aggressively writing on 
CDS. Finally, we present concluding remarks. 
 
1. Overview of Credit Derivatives Market 
Credit derivatives are the fastest growing area of the OTC derivatives during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. According to British Bankers Association (Figure 1), the global outstanding of CDs grew from $180 billion 
notional value in 1996 to $20 trillion in 2006, about 112 times the market size of 1996. By June 2008, notional 
amounts of CDs were estimated to rise over $33 trillion. CDs become a key instrument in the financial capital as a 
tool to manage credit exposure. These instruments are designed initially to isolate the credit risk of the underlying 
asset, by providing insurance against a specific exposure of credit events (Eales and Choudhry, 2003), but have 
actually become a serious tool of trading. 
 
 
The rapid growth in CDs was mostly driven by increased request from banks and other financial institutions to 
manage their credit exposure. The growth of these tools came into existence when the uncertainly business world 
was rising (Gupta, 2005). With the use of CDs, banks can actively unbundle and manage credit risk in 
unprecedented ways, and can convert their credit risk profiles rapidly (Schinasi et al., 2000).  
There are fundamentally two reasons why the participations on credit derivatives market have found them attractive, 
the first one is, Credit Derivatives can allow businesses to manage effectively exposures to a credit related event and 
customize the credit exposure intended, without having proximate relationship with other parties (Lore and 
Borodovsky, 2000) The flexibility of CDs and as they are over the counter OTC financial tools, they can be 
designed to meet specific requirements of dealers so these instruments of risk dispersion satisfied the needs of 
investors who wanted to reduce asset risk in volatile markets (Eales and Choudhry, 2003). The other is, the usage of 
CDs allows the main dealers to trade more efficiently and employs less capital and can be designed to meet specific 
counterparty’s requirements. 
 
1-1 Problem Statement 
  Undoubtedly, CDs have been the most important financial innovations in the last few decades; however, there have 
been many studies suggest that the risks that they trigger are wide harder than feasibilities generated.  
Warren Buffet claims that CDs are “weapons of mass destruction”. These words had been written five years before 
the credit crisis broke out. In contrast speeches as chairman of the Federal Reserve System, Alan Greenspan states 
“that credit derivatives and other complex financial instruments have contributed to the development of a far more 
flexible, efficient, and then resilient financial system”. Alan Greenspan’s impression is that credit derivatives are 
sensational tools to efficiently allocate risk, expediting the access of many businesses into credit. Greenspan further 
indicates that the risk dispersion tools CDs have capacitated the largest and most professional banks in their credit-
afford role to shun much credit exposure by transferring it to institutions with far less leverage. This paper argues 
that the unprecedented growth of CDs of all kinds, mainly Credit Default Swaps CDS, and there hidden dangers 
have considerably contributed to the exacerbation and transmission of the financial crisis. While CDs can generate 
benefits, these instruments have a significant effect on financial markets, both in mitigating the trading of credit risk 
and increasing financial transactions complexity. However, the affirmative thought of the role of credit risk transfer 
has been criticized and CDs are blameful for portion of the difficulties associated with the subprime credit crisis. 
 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the nature, uses and the main issues of CDs in financial markets. Further, we 
aim to investigate whether CDS are a key contributory factor to the 2007 global financial crisis. The analytical focus 
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is on the major protection seller, American International Group AIG, which was one of the most active credit market 
participants and a major player in the derivatives market.   
 
2- Credit Derivatives and Financial Crisis 2007 
 
2.1 Credit Derivatives and Market Challenges 
As all other insurance's tools, CDs could be subject to moral hazard and asymmetric information risks (see Duffee 
and Zhou, 2001). Definitely, asymmetric information and insider trading issues probably exist in most markets. 
Although CDs are valuable tools that have traditionally helped businesses efficiently allocate risk, they may reduce 
monitoring inspection and can execute to moral hazard on the part of debtors who are subject to less financial 
discipline from the lenders (Skeel and Partnoy, 2007). For any given loan, the originated bank and other lenders are 
normally in the best situation to monitor the ongoing creditworthiness of borrower. The lenders’ incentive to fulfil 
this monitoring position, however, will be raging decreased if the bank subsequently takes up credit protection on 
this loan by CDs. While loan sales and securitizations as tools for managing credit exposure structured so that 
originator maintains monitoring incentives, CDs generally is not (Bohn, 2002). 
Moral Hazard typically, and its relation to CDs market particularly, is one of the greatest challenges facing 
regulators (Hellmann et al. 2000). It is an agency problem in which there arises an additional or intensified risk, in 
consequence of the existence of a contract or mitigating arrangement, which therefore causes a lowering of the 
naturally risk-averse parties’ behaviour involved with concern to their efforts to avoid negative underlying results. 
Not suddenly, the accelerative growth of the market likewise new CDs and the increased importance of new market 
players pose challenges to CDs markets particularly and to the financial system as a whole. For instance, one of the 
main features of CDS's market is pull the considerable financial institutions and other market participants into a 
complicated net of interconnections where the defeat of any one institution might easily begin a domino impact, 
probably lowering the global financial system. 
 As CDs markets are yet exceptionally fuzzy because market participants are not in demand to expose their deals. 
The Lack of transparency has been pointed as a key risk in the OTC derivatives market. 
 (Ashraf, et al., 2007) argue that so as to deal with CDs, corporations require serious financial, human and 
intellectual capital inclusive sophisticated internal control and risk management systems. Hence, it needs regulatory 
scrutiny in order to ensure that these instruments are not used to put financial stability at risk. 
 
2.2 The Role of Credit Derivatives in Financial Crisis 2007    
The positive view of the role of credit risk transfer has been criticized and CDs have been blamed for part of the 
difficulties associated with the subprime credit crisis. (Skeel and Partnoy 2007) pointed out that CDs “create the risk 
of systemic market failure,” partly because they minimize incentives to monitor the borrowers and therefore fuel 
credit expansion (Acharya, 2007; Xing and Yuqin 2012) argue that when the U.S. subprime mortgage happened in 
the mid of 2007, CDs have overtaken as a critical cause for the crisis. Due to financial contagion, credit exposure 
spread rapidly among banks and other financial institutions, which led to global financial crisis.  
As we have mentioned before, that the largest sector of the CDs market is the CDS (Figure 2). Even though they are 
considered successful financial innovations to reduce risk through hedging, they also contribute to the completeness 
of the market, by providing market participants with a possibility to take a view on the default risk of a reference 
entity, on a company or a sovereign borrower (Gonzalez et.al, 2012). Many have argued that derivatives and 
especially CDS should be forbidden, others have debated that the issues arising from CDS during the credit crisis 
resulted from the misuse of those instruments and from the lack of regulation on the market.  
 
Basically, there are three reasons why observers argue that CDs in general and CDS specifically have contributed to 
the crisis and are dangerous: (Stulz, 2010)  
The first argument states that CDs market participants such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and AIG have 
allowed constructing huge risk positions, and these positions have created systemic risk. These enormous exposures 
led to a confidence crisis in financial institutions consequent the collapse of Lehman as major participants on the 
market. The second argument is that the lack of transparency of the CDS market has made it feasible for entities that 
participate on market to manipulate that market, herewith making it seems that some financial institutions were 
1029 Walaa’ Ismael Alnassar et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  109 ( 2014 )  1026 – 1034 
much weaker on their financial position than they in fact were and minatory the soundness of the financial system. 
Such manipulations are often interrogated to have been partially responsible for the fall of Bear Stearns and Lehman.  
Lastly, the CDS market participated to “connectivity” increase in global financial markets. The collapse of major 
financial institutions that deal in CDS market could potentially lead to stark domino impact. (Hellmann et. al., 2000) 
claimed that banking crises are critical not just because of the wastefulness that they bring to specific sector of the 
economy, but in consequence of the shock waves attack the whole economy.  
On the other side Stulz (2010) argue that the credit crisis dramatic events did not caused by trading of the CDs tools, 
the over-the-counter CDS market act well during the early years of the credit crisis, and created positive positions 
with comparative cost compared OTC trading. In recent time, there has been a positive view for using of CDs, in the 
belief that their use has contributed to improving the solidity of the system’s financial during the financial crisis. 
The ability to transfer credit risk means that banks are less vulnerable to shocks of liquidity and reduces the overall 
level of risk on their balance sheets. However, it is also possible that the existing of CDs markets can promote 
further practices of financial risk management, an argument that became obvious after the financial crisis. This 
could offset any positive impact on the stability of financial institutions (Wagner, 2007; Instefjord, 2005). As 
pointed out by Gibson (2007) and Minton et al. (2009), CDs used by banks to hedge and reduce the risk of credit 
portfolios, but at the same time they create an additional risk.  
The trouble of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG constructed outside the OTC derivatives markets, but they 
were large dealers in these markets. Due to the CDS written by them (the case of AIG) or because of their leading 
role in all derivatives markets (the case of Lehman and Bear Sterns), difficulties spilled over to the global financial 
market. The opaqueness of the derivatives market in general and CDs market in specific prohibited other market 
participants from knowing accurately what the exposures of their counterparties were to these three financial 
institutions, which bring in distrust and suddenly drying up of liquidity. Furthermore, it prevented regulators from 
recognizing early the build-up and concentration of risks and potential repercussions on financial world stability. 
The crisis militated obvious how derivatives in general and CDS in particular, created a netting of reciprocal 
dependence difficult to understand, disentangle and contained in the instant aftermath of credit crisis.  
Bear Stearns had a reputability as an aggressive investment bank willing to take risks. Fortune magazine listed the 
bank as one the most admired securities firm in 2005. It was one of the most highly leveraged firms on Wall Street. 
The bank’s history indicated both innovative and creative which, possibly, caused it to share some risky positions. 
The bankruptcy of the bank in March 2008 and its eventual sale to JPMorgan was a key factor in recognizing the 
infirmities of risk management that led to the meltdown in the financial services industry and the following global 
financial crisis. Bear Stearns’ stock have acquired by JPMorgan for $2, the stock’s price declined from $17, 00 to $2, 
00 within six months. (Dimon, 2008) indicated that the JPMorgan Chase’s acquisition denotatively was to repossess 
the confidence of Bear Stearns’s stockholders. The United States government, however, indirectly salvaged Bear 
Stearns with $30 billion by supporting JPMorgan to conclude the transaction. 
  Lehman brothers’ bankruptcy resulted in considerable knock on impacts, because Lehman brothers was a 
significant CDS reference entity likewise one of the largest CDS market counterparties (Fitch, 2007). The firm had 
obtained huge amounts of subprime. Lehman's CDS report had a gross notional of 72 billion dollars and there was 
initially considerable uncertainty and complexity in identifying closeout positions and substituting defaulted trades. 
After default of Lehman Brothers, many large banks declared that they had several thousand contracts of CDs with 
Lehman Brothers and sustained huge losses while attempting to close out the risk poisons or finding other 
counterparty (Jungmann and Sagemann, 2011).  
Differently to the business nature of insurance work, which it relatively low-risk business of life insurance and 
Pension services, AIG were directed into more risky investments, taking enormous exposures across mortgage-
backed securities and CDS contracts, many of which were established on bad underlying asset such as sub-prime 
debt. AIG has been identified as “unique” among major participations of CDS market, differ from other dealers its 
book included approximately of sold protection. The company did not take offset positions in CDS market. Because 
its model anticipated that any of reference assets that the company had protection would be ground to credit events 
(Warren, 2010). According to firm’s reports, AIG financial products insured $513 billion of debt versus default 
usage credit default swaps contracts. As a consequence of this exposure, any credit rating decline would cause 
critical destabilizing and fluctuations in those markets as counterparties settled their contracts and asserted their 
claims (Ibid). Counterparty credit relations on CDS and other activities that it is possible failure created systematic 
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risks interconnected AIG with many large financial institutions, investment and commercial banks. (Chaplin, 2010) 
claimed that, in spite of AIG's huge exposures to these financial innovations, its financial models only appreciated 
the risk of default of the underlying obligations. However, in the second half of 2007 the major counterparties 
demanding billions of dollars of collateral as a result of worsen credit markets. AIG could not obtain sufficient 
liquidity to pay its obligations.   
Even though of the fact that CDs have been mainly used as hedge tools, they are used also for speculative purposes. 
A report published by Fitch Ratings claim that about 58% of global banks the major motivation for using CDs is 
“trading”, while only 30% of global banks had “hedging” as their predominant motivation for using credit 
derivatives. Therefore, if banks are predominantly driven by a profit motive in using CDs (i.e. trading), then it is 
important for banks to realize the risk characteristics that would make them more vulnerable in stress conditions.  
(Minton et al., 2009) assist that the typical position in CDs is taken for speculation activities rather than for hedging 
credit risks.  
These arguments on the role of CDs rise the question of what role has CDs played in the current financial crisis. The 
issue is not only how much banks and other financial institutions should used these tools to manage their credit risk 
whereas which position the banks have to take in CDs market whether it is net protection buyers or net protection 
sellers to indicate that the CDs have been used to speculate or to avoid the credit exposure. And with their critical 
issues, are they still effective hedging tools for credit risk dispersion. It has distinctly articulated that the features of 
OTC derivatives markets – leverage, the special nature of contracting with restricted information, the complicated 
web of mutual dependences, the hardness of understanding the risk’s nature and a very high uncertainty in distressed 
markets, supping financial stability. 
 
 
3- AIG: Case Study 
 
3.1 AIG: Background 
  American International Group is one of the world largest insurance companies, with three main lines of insurance 
activities, including general insurance, life insurance and retirement services, financial services, and assets 
management. AIG has business in more than 130 countries with about 50% of its revenues obtained from its foreign 
operations. The company declared 2007 earnings of $6.20 billion or $2.39 per share and closing price of its stock 
that day was $50.15 (Sjostrum, 2009).  
In 1989, AIG constructed its largely unregulated Financial Products Division (AIG-FP) for trading adversity of 
compound financial instruments such as swap agreements (Kolb, 2011). CDS are financial tools that transfer the 
credit exposure from one party to another (Figure 3). The seller, who is offering credit protection, consents, in return 
for periodic premium, to remunerate the buyer if a specific credit event, such as default, falls out. CDS are valuable 
financial instruments that have actually helped businesses efficiently allocate risk; however, these financial 
innovation tools have also created the potential for relatively few market players to destabilize the whole economic 
system (Dickinson, 2008). AIG was so interrelated with many major commercial and investment banks and other 
financial institutions that primarily purchased protection from AIG for their own debt portfolios through 
counterparty credit relations on CDS (Ibid). 
 Since 2000s AIG has been increasingly active in the CDs market, including CDS. As protection seller, AIG had 
circa $500 billion notional exposure in its CDS positions (Stowell, 2012). The institution was a provider of 
insurance guarantees on risky credit default swaps tied to the mortgage market. 
 
3.2 AIG Bankruptcy and bailout 
   During the pre-crisis period the AIG-FP was heavily involved in issuing CDS contracts. It had sold CDS contracts 
approximately $440 billion debt securities. Many of its CDS agreements obligated AIG to protect risky mortgage –
backed securities that depicting subprime mortgage (Madura, 2010). On September 16, 2008 AIG’s stocks prices 
inclined to $1.25 a 95% downgrade from the 52-week high price of $70.13 (Sjostrum, 2009). The insured company 
suffered billions of dollars of losses from entering into CDS contracts to insure against losses on complex MBS. 
When its securities lost value, their owners filed claim on AIG, resulting in 2008 wastages totalling nearly $100 
billion. The continued drop in AIG’s share price was indicative of issues in the market about its ability to continue 
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to access short-term capital markets and its need for additional capital because of the regression of its real estate 
securities (Eisenbeis, 2009). 
 AIG had earlier been an AAA investment-grade risk, its credit rating was drop, requiring the company to come up 
with $14 billion in cash so quickly to collateralize its existent loans and specified obligations on CDSs. If it could 
not achieve the situation, AIG would be in default on those loans, which could execute to its failure.  
Most of AIG’s counterparties were banks that brought CDS because they wanted to hedge against declines in the 
MBS held on their balance sheets. AIG’s counterparties resorted on AIG to act well on the credit default swaps if 
their underlying investments in the mortgage pools or other companies’ debts withdrawing. One of AIG’s major 
trading partners was Goldman Sachs. It had protected other investors in the mortgage market on about $14 billion of 
securities, and then bought credit protection from AIG at a lower rate, benefiting from the $50 million dissimilitude 
(Roe, 2011).  
As housing status weakened further, disseminations broadcast that AIG might not able to meet all the future 
commitments on its CDS contracts due to defaults. The Federal government was concerned that if AIG could not 
cover its claims, all its counterparties that had bought CDS contracts from AIG would drop their protection and 
could potentially fail. The government realized that AIG was too big to fail and committed by more than $180 
billion to its rescuer. The decision was made to save the company; because AIG’s exposure was considerable and its
disorderly failure would probably explode concatenation reaction could have dropped out its counterparties, causing 
cascading losses and collapses throughout the financial system (Schoenbaum, 2012).  
CDSs were widely blamed for necessitating of AIG’s rescue and as an essentially cause of the recent financial crisis; 
CDSs fomented panic as the price of credit protection aculeate and contributing to the Federal Reserve’s decision to 
bail out American International Group (Kress, 2010). The purpose of providing liquidity is to support AIG in 
covering its obligations as they come due.  
In September 2008, after AIG credit rating downgraded in consequence of value recession of its direct investments 
in subprime mortgages (Roe, 2011), AIG was in crisis, which reflected in its common stock value declining over 
95% by September 16,2008.   AIG suffered a major decline in share price; the firm’s common stock value decreased 
from 22.76 in Sep 8 to 12.14 in Sep 12 which making improbable to access capital from private lenders.    
 
  3.3 AIG: an aggressively writing on CDS 
AIG was one of the biggest worldwide sellers of credit protection. Through its CDS business, the American 
International Group was leveraging furthermore its then-AAA credit rating and balance sheet of trillion dollars. 
Counterparties were likely interested to pay AIG-FP a higher premium for protection in respect of AIG's guarantee 
than they would pay for the same credit protection from a seller with lower credit rating and less-favourable 
guarantee. This is because higher credit quality is an indicator of higher credit rating and, as a result, a lower 
possibility that a protection seller will default on its obligations under the CDS.  Since AIG itself used to be highly -
rating enterprise, one of sufficiently high quality that its derivatives counterparties did not initially require it to post 
collateral that made the contracts all the more profitable (Jungmann and Sugmann, 2011;Roe, 2011).  
 AIG’s counterparties depended on AIG to make good on the CDS if their underlying investments in the mortgage 
pools or other companies’ debts deteriorated. AIG’s derivatives counterparties did not initially require it to post 
collateral. The company instead agreed, “to post generous collateral if the value of the insured securities dropped or 
if its own credit rating downgraded (Roe, 2011). When the credit rating agencies declared they were considered 
downgraded AIG lesser than an AA rating, the size of collateral the firm had to put out its CDS short position was 
sharply stepped up (Ibid).  
AIG began suffering a serious drain on its finances, when the institution started to post increasing amounts of 
collateral to its counterparties that had bought CDS because of the sharply drop in company’s share market value 
(Mirochnik, 2010). AIG’s liquidity adversely affected by requirements to post collateral, the amount of collateral 
required to be posted for its CDS determined basis of the security’s value or loan referenced in credit default swap’s 
documentation. Ongoing declines in the referenced securities values or loans will enhance the amount of collateral 
that AIG-FP must post which could deteriorate AIG’s liquidity (Vasudev, 2010). 
AIG had to post additional collateral in value of more than $20 billion. The company held over $1 trillion in assets, 
but most its liquid assets, inclusive cash, was held by AIG’s subsidiaries whose regulators did not primate the cash 
to flow freely up to the holding company. The company’s liabilities, particularly those due in the near future, were 
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much larger than the $9 billion on hand. AIG tried to access funds from capital market but did not succeed. A 
creditor that supposes any institution will fail soon is unlikely to provide funding due to higher probability of losses 
and bankruptcy.  AIG had already put up billions of dollars in collateral to its CDS counterparties. By June of 2008, 
counterparties were requesting $15.7 billion, and AIG had posted $13.2 billion. By September 12, the calls had 
increased suddenly to $23.4 billion, and AIG had paid $18.9 billion—$7.6 billion to Goldman alone, and it appeared 
very likely that AIG would call to post billions more in the near future. The company had hardness in liquidating 
considerable amounts of assets quickly enough. Thus, soon after the company’s downgrade, the U.S. government 
felt forced on systemic basis to provide a support package for AIG (Schich, 2010). The government responses to 
these events transmit signals concerning the government’s role in financial markets and these signals convert how 
businesses respond to such events in the future. AIG received assistant due to its significance to the stability of the 
whole financial system.  
Why did AIG-FP write protection in such contracts? What’s gone wrong with CDS? Were they alone causing of 
financial crisis? The answers summarize as below:  
• At the time that AIG insurance businesses were healthful, on December 31, 2007, its annual report cited total 
assets of $1.06 trillion, shareholders' equity of $95.8 billion, and a market capitalization of $150.7 billion. 
Problems began when its AIG-PF has been established, a unit which sold the complex CDS. Its exposure in 
CDS positions tied closely to the mortgage-backed securities and credit markets. By selling credit production 
on mortgage –backed securities; the firm used CDS to make a big bet on housing, which was considered the 
key cause of current crisis (Moyer et.al, 2012; wall street journal, 2008).  
• Earlier, the senior executive of AIG-FP identified writing CDS as "gold" and "free money” and as the company 
empire scored in May 2008 conference call presentation, Its CDS business was very analogous to its excess 
casualty insurance business, a business that had generated massive profits for many years. CDSs permit risks to 
be spread more excessively instead of being fastened vulnerable points. However, AIG reported over $31.2 in 
losses in the first six months of 2008 (Sjostrum, 2009). Blaming CDS for AIG’s credit crisis essentially 
because it putting up without elementary collateral, locating capital reserves, or hedging its short position in 
CDS. 
• AIG executed highly leveraged business; the largest insurance company’s total capitalization was $95.8 billion 
by December 31, 2007. It used highly leveraged finance for its CDS business, and as it is known, if all other 
things being equal, companies with highly leveraged balance sheets are more exposure than those with less 
leverage.  In this context, (Skeel and Partnoy, 2007) indicated that CDS positions are often highly leveraged and 
they do not involve a high pre- financing. This enables companies to enter large selling positions without 
restrictions.  
• The AIG-FP's risk models indicated that the underlying securities of CDS would never go into default. The 
company relied on Gorton† models that did not furnish with a device to monitor the CDS’s underling entity’ 
market value as well as could not foresee the market forces and the sophisticated contract terms that could 
mobilize CDS into unexpected and huge financial claims (Ferrell et.al, 2009). The issue here lays in the CDS 
themselves and actually how they are modelled and how well modelling effects are understood and realized by 
management. 
• AIG is exposed to various significant risks, and AIG’s risk management tools and controls may not be quite
effective in alleviating AIG’s risk exposures in all market situations and to all types of risk. AIG was so 
interconnected with many large financial institutions, investment and commercial banks by counterparty in
credit relations on CDS positions which likely failure create systematic risk. The Contribution of bilateral
CDS market on -or at least creation the panic of systemic risk arising from interconnected exposures. In spite 
of sophisticated risk management tools, counterparty risk is an unavoidable confidentiality of CDS markets
(Kress, 2010); therefore CDS were blaming as a significant contributor to the financial crisis through
interconnections. 
 
 
4- Conclusion 
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  Many practical issues have arisen by rapidly growth of CDs market from around 1990 onwards; some of these 
challenges reflect the immaturity of the credit derivatives market, CDS as the main common types of credit 
derivatives are highly leveraged and they do not require a high pre- financing. This enables companies to enter large 
selling positions without restrictions. Therefore, the increase-misuse of these products has decreased transparency 
and increased the abuses in financial markets. 
With the American International Group as a case-in-example, one of the world's leading corporations and its AIG-
FP a subsidiary which heavily issued and traded credit default swaps, it was one of the biggest worldwide sellers of 
credit protection on mortgage –backed securities, we discuss the issue whether CDs in general, and CDS in 
particular, helped exacerbated credit crisis 2008. By selling credit production, AIG had exposure for $64 billion due 
to the default of its counterparties as well as the risk models of the firm indicated that the underlying securities of 
CDS would never go into default. Furthermore it is exposed to various significant risks, executed highly leveraged 
business and trading in CDS without elementary collateral, locating capital reserves and did not engage offsetting 
positions in CDS. American International Group, for its size, however, was considered systemically important and 
thus not allowed to fail. AIG received assistant due to its significance to the stability of the whole financial system. 
In Conclusion, we have to mention that, the complexity features, the widespread - misuse of CDS themselves 
contributed to AIG near bankruptcy and therefore to exacerbate the global financial crisis. Another issue at AIG-PF 
can be viewed as a failing of evaluating the risk, which associated with CDS positions that led to the company’s 
liquidity issues and risk management failure. However, we should support the necessity for a more stringent credit 
risk management system and high –quality counterparties that would make banks and other credit holders less 
vulnerable to the risks when dealing in CDS markets. 
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